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Introduction 
The Irish model of social partnership is comparatively unusual in the way that it accommodates the 
involvement of farmer associations and community and voluntary sector organisations. Like other 
countries, Ireland has had some previous experience with tripartite governance (during the 1970s) 
although, since 1987 when this type of arrangement re-commenced, a more sophisticated model 
embedded traditional actors more firmly in a strategic consensus and drew in a wider spectrum of 
interests. This paper explores the entry, context and significance of one of these new actors, the 
community-voluntary pillar (CVP), whose inclusion in social partnership might, from certain 
perspectives, seem anomalous. For the organisations involved, this was a landmark in a process of 
evolving participation taking several years. A number of organisations active in the fields of anti-
unemployment work, social welfare campaigning, and community development, had emerged during 
the 1980s against a background of economic and political malaise. Not aligned to political parties they 
became quite politicised in their understanding of their role and potential. From the late 1980s, they 
began a process that changed their status from external critics to critical participants in what was 
increasingly dubbed social partnership. This eventually culminated in the " Community Pillar" in 
October 1996, when the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) John Bruton invited a number of organisations to 
form a group for the purposes of joining in formal talks on a new Social Partnership programme 
(Partnership 2000) that winter. 
Against a background of debate on the significance of social partnership more broadly, which tends to 
make few references to the CVP at the national level, and explorations focused solely on local, area 
based development Partnerships, this paper takes a national level focus. It is suggested that the national 
origins of the CVP and its entry to social partnership lie in a fiscal and economic crisis and in turn a 
crisis of legitimacy and governance. Moreover, this crisis was not capable of being resolved through 
social partnership based on "conventional" social partners alone and the initial model had its own 
legitimation deficits in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Ultimately, that crisis passed, however, and the 
subsequent role and significance of the CVP was altered, and in some respects diminished.  
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 The paper addresses these themes in the following sequence. First, it sets out the economic and political 
context for the social partnership process that began in 1987. Second, it identifies the circumstances 
leading to the innovation of the community and voluntary pillar, and the processes of its creation. 
Finally, it looks at the case of the Irish National Organisation for the Unemployed,  (INOU) - one of the 
initial driving forces within the CVP and its pathway into Social Partnership. The focus is mainly on 
the earlier period, to the late 1990s. Conclusions on the case of the INOU in this phase cannot be 
readily applied to other components of the Community Pillar or to the more recent phase.  
The paper is sceptical about grand-theoretical portrayals of social partnership (or the CVP within it) 
and its influence on the economic wonder of the Celtic Tiger. Nor does it engage directly in debate on 
the implications of social partnership for democracy generally. However, it does point to the need to 
address such questions in concrete rather than speculative ways.  
The paper may be relevant to wider issues, such as ways in which “third sector” organisations become 
involved in policy processes at national level and what outcomes we can expect from such 
involvement. In contrast to other countries where the "third sector" is either independent (USA) or 
given a defined role in delivery (Germany), or largely peripheral (UK) the case of Irish social 
partnership has revealed another possibility. The paper tries to avoid the kind of generalisations of a 
negative and positive kind that characterise discussions of the pillar. It is viewed neither as regime 
transformation "by" civil society nor Thatcherism in corporatist drag!  The content and conclusions 
flow from research that attempts to explore the CVP’s role empirically, combining documentary and 
interview material. A series of face to face taped interviews with some 25 leading figures from the 
Community Pillar and numbers of others outside the Pillar inform the paper. However, only a subset of 
these interviews, particularly with past and present leading INOU figures, are drawn on here and, even 
then, only in an illustrative way.  
Why examine the Community Pillar? 
The significance of the community pillar is a relatively minor theme in discussions of social 
partnership at national level in Ireland. At one level, discussions of social partnership tend to revolve 
around corporatist paradigms in which the comparative focus is on union-employer-state relationships 
(Hardiman 2000, 1998, 1988; Rhodes 2000, Baccaro and Simoni 2004). A theme in this debate is 
where to place Ireland in terms of industrial relations models ranging from corporatism to liberal 
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 pluralism. The term competitive corporatism (Rhodes 2000) has gained currency in distinguishing 
between neo-liberal or social corporatist characterisations in the Irish case. In this comparative 
industrial relations context, the "local" dimension refers to industrial bargaining/partnership at the level 
of workplace, firm, industry or sector and is very important in comparative discussion of corporatism. 
The extent and significance of local partnership in this context is the focus of critical debate in relation 
to the Irish case (McCartney and Teague 1997, Roche and Geary 1998).  
But in the Irish context, when “local partnership” is discussed, it usually has nothing to do industrial 
relations but refers to local community development and programmes operating under EU or 
government auspices such as LEADER groups, local development partnership companies and 
community development groups. Local partnership in the latter context has been an intensive area of 
activity in Ireland over the past 15 years whose comparative context is very distinct from that of 
corporatism and industrial relations. While industrial relations has diverged from the UK standard since 
the 1980s, there is much in Ireland to compare - in relation to local or community development 
partnership models - with the UK and other EU states (Chanan et al 2000). The difficulty is that the 
Community Pillar is usually discussed in relation to the latter alone and discussion tends to become 
dominated by local issues (Rush 1999; Powell and Geoghegan 2004). Conversely, when considered in 
the corporatist context, it is possibly viewed as anomalous in that community and voluntary 
organisations deal almost exclusively with government. In that sense they are not strictly "social 
partners” participating in a bargaining process that the government facilitates - as with employers and 
unions (Hardiman 2000: p. 301-4).  
There is some justification for exploring the industrial relations and local development agendas 
separately. However, the national level significance of community and voluntary pillar (CVP) can be 
missed unless the account is situated in a wider perspective of state-civil society relations and a 
historical perspective. This article takes the view that the origins of the CVP and its inclusion in the 
process of national level social partnership can be fruitfully explored in the context of a crisis for the 
political elite and for liberal representative politics in the face of deepening social malaise. The 
instigation of social partnership not only served to address the underlying economic and social 
problems which the political elite had failed to resolve, but also provided an institutional mechanism to 
alleviate a political crisis of legitimacy. The origins and influence of the CVP are tied up with attempts 
to address the underlying social crisis but ultimately its fate would be shaped by the resolution of that 
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 crisis. While the political elite has regained much lost ground, social partnership has not only continued 
but its institutional supports have been strengthened. Indeed, in practice and sometimes in principle, 
social partnership is now embraced by most of the political establishment.  
Some commentaries have viewed CVP involvement as either undesirable and undemocratic 
(O'Cinnéide 1998/9) or grievously undermining the independence of  "civil society" (Meade 200). The 
view here is that the participants in the pillar had few other options but to participate in the initial 
period, made some noteworthy gains for a time but were increasingly constrained to operate with great 
patience and perseverance in order to maintain any influence in the process. Moreover, the several 
associations and organisations in the CVP have often been obliged to go through difficult internal 
debate in order to maintain coherence, recognition and relevance to other participants.  Yet the 
unhappiness among those who have been excluded from the arrangements and the eagerness of others 
to get in suggests that the outcomes are not clear-cut. 
A context of crisis 
Fiscal crisis - legitimation crisis 
The elaboration of a system of social partnership was a long time in coming about and may be viewed 
as the last resort when the political elite, given the nature of Irish political culture, failed to respond to 
the fiscal crisis that had been welling up since the early 1970s. The concept of fiscal crisis has been in 
the international literature since the aftermath of the first oil shocks (O'Connor 1973) and usually also 
entails legitimation crisis (Habermas 1976, Held 1982). Such a crisis in Britain gave political 
expression to the new paradigm of neo-liberal economics and neo-conservative politics, with an 
electoral mandate in 1979. Ireland, by contrast, lumbered from election to election with what seemed - 
from a right or left perspective - as half-measures, aptly summarised by Lee (1989: Ch. 7) as "drift". 
Others go further, noting that political decision-makers made errors that accentuated the fiscal crisis 
(Honohan and Walsh 2002).  
Nonetheless, the turn to social partnership, which ended the "drift", was not a decisive ideological 
paradigm shift in the political establishment so much an institutional or policy-making paradigm shift.  
Honohan et al see in social partnership a determination by unions and employers to set aside social 
class antagonism, for the time being, in favour of a joint effort to remove barriers to employment 
growth. However, this was to be achieved by first addressing the crisis of the public finances rather 
than seeking unemployment reduction through fiscal expansion.  
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 Beyond that constraint there were many policy options - including the extension of social partnership 
institutions themselves. Initially, however, the new institutionalism was to facilitate a period of sharp 
fiscal correction and expressed the incorporation of state and civil society in the form of the trade 
unions and employers in particular. The inclusion of the farmers too was indicative of the fact that the 
agenda was already wider than the management of industrial relations. However, the institutional 
model of governance was not yet complete or "legitimate" in the view of many until it was eventually 
extended in the mid-1990s to include the voices of marginalised sections of society as articulated via 
the community and voluntary sector. 
Governmental crisis 
The immediate context for the initiation of social partnership in 1987 was a unique political crisis. A 
newly installed minority government of Fianna Fail was promised the support of the main opposition 
party Fine Gael provided that it introduced new austerity measures designed to control spiralling state 
debt and deficits and restore balance to the public finances (the so-called Tallaght Strategy). Such 
centre-right consensus had been previously lacking and had contributed to a growing sense of malaise 
in the political elite during the 1980s that not only threatened economic sustainability but also widened 
the "legitimation gap" that was opening between political elite and the wider society (Larragy 2002).  
Fine Gael's policy was a double-edged sword not only for Fine Gael but also for the incoming minority 
Fianna Fail Government, which was "damned if it did and damned of it didn’t" address the fiscal crisis 
there and then. However, responsibility for the cutbacks would fall on the government party and could 
cost it dearly in a subsequent election. The prospect of further electoral attrition for Fianna Fail was not 
to be treated lightly. This led them to grasp the lifeline of proposals made by the NESC (1986) as a 
basis for a new type of social pact between employers and unions. Unlike the 1970s experience, 
centrally moderated wage bargaining from 1987 would be co-ordinated with the austerity measures – 
an approach about which the Fine Gael and Progressive Democrat opposition were then quite sceptical 
(MacSharry 2000).  
Industrial development crisis 
Ireland was still a predominantly agricultural country in 1961, with 42% of male employment in 
agriculture. Opening the economy in 1958 to trade and foreign investment changed this, but the process 
was slow and new jobs were by cancelled secular decline in the numbers occupied in farming (Hannan 
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 and Commins 1992, Teagasc 2004). Total employment only grew by on average 0.3% annually while 
non-agricultural employment grew by 1.3% between 1960 and 1990 (NESC 1993: 3).  
Ireland's belated economic expansion was only a qualified success as imports seriously impacted on 
formerly protected indigenous industry while the latter made few inroads abroad (O'Malley 1992). 
Initially policy only drew foreign investors in the form of branch plants in mature industries (textiles, 
footwear, clothing, plastics and light engineering) and later in pharmaceuticals and electronics but, 
investors were attracted by low wages and low taxes and plants were confined to semi-skilled 
production stages. Furthermore, against expert advice proposing fewer, more sustainable growth 
centres designed to generate positive spillovers, government policy in the 1970s favoured geographical 
dispersion of investment. Although this is defended on the grounds that it helped rural communities at a 
time when the CAP favoured larger farmers (Hannan and Commins 1992) there is a case to answer as 
to its sustainability and the impact on traditional industrial centres. The foreign sectors too - albeit not 
as badly as indigenous industries - were hit in the 1970s and many proved unsustainable. A key policy 
reversal was signalled in the 1982 Telesis Report (NESC 1982) which called for a turn towards high-
value-added investment typically in large population centres with a critical mass of high-skill and 
educated labour but it took considerable time for the latter shift in policy to take effect. Total 
employment in the foreign sector actually declined in the1980s as the benefits of this strategy were 
overshadowed by closures in older sectors (O'Malley 1992).  
On the labour side, investment in post-primary and tertiary education, minimal to start with, expanded 
from the late 1960s. But population grew rapidly (15.6% between 1971 and 1981) in a context of high 
marriage and fertility rates and a reversal of net emigration. In the 1980s Ireland had a rapidly growing 
young and increasingly educated generation but as yet insufficient investment to employ it fully at 
home. As pointed out by some economists (Honohan et al 2002) Ireland's fiscal crisis would not look 
so bad if viewed in terms of the huge potential of its demographic profile. Alas, this was not sufficient 
to alleviate the debt!  
Urban and rural exclusion - seedbed of community action 
By the mid-1980s, therefore, emigration was beckoning even to the most highly qualified graduates and 
the net outflows of the late 1980s had become alarming. While Ireland's fiscal status was parlous in the 
1980s employment growth was stagnant, unemployment was also at crisis levels and levels of social 
marginalisation were arguably unprecedented. In the1991 census, unemployment was 233,890 (16.8%) 
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 - high by comparative standards in Europe, with a high percentage of long-term unemployed. In urban 
areas there were substantial problems of economic and increasingly social marginalisation and many 
"black spots" with catastrophic levels of unemployment and poverty (NESC 1997: 51ff; 85ff). The 
issue of unemployment provided the basis for the emergence of unemployed organisations and at 
national level the Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed (INOU). The INOU was 
sociologically rooted in the unemployed and its agenda was defined around the goal of full 
employment and, pending that, the protection of the rights of the unemployed and income maintenance. 
One of its main defensive issues to emerge from interviews and in the literature of the INOU, was the 
prevention of "workfare" schemes and punitive measures being proffered at the height of the crisis and 
into the early 1990s.  
Rural life was also characterised by unevenness and inequality. While there was unemployment in rural 
towns and villages, there was considerable out-migration - both to larger urban locations and abroad in 
the 1980s. Age profiles of rural areas typically exhibited the highest proportions of elderly people but 
also moderate young dependency rates. As agricultural employment declined there were serious 
difficulties in fostering alternative types of rural development activity. Certain areas, typically in the 
west, north-west, border and midlands, were particularly vulnerable due to declining population in the 
employment age group. One of the few hopes in the late 1980s was Europe. The 1987 Single European 
Act (SEA) and completion of the internal market would provide Ireland with a great opportunity to 
position itself as the gateway to Europe while threats to industry were by now limited as there had been 
such a shakeout in the Irish economy already. However, it was a still a very peripheral country with 
very poor infrastructure and, of course, the Irish state was debt encumbered. The SEA set the stage for 
radical shake-up of the Structural Funds, in 1988, aimed at reducing regional development disparities in 
Europe.  Their objectives of supporting infrastructure, regional development, economically deprived 
regions and localities and tackling long-term and youth unemployment suited Ireland's needs. In 1989, 
the EC provided for a doubling of resources for the Structural Funds, in what was subsequently known 
as the first of the Delors packages. Ireland as a whole was designated an Objective 1 region which 
ensured that Ireland received priority status. Over the two subsequent periods Structural and (after 
Maastricht) Cohesion funding - between 1989 and 1999 -would amount to an EC contribution of €11 
billion. 
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 The reform of the Structural funds involved new processes of consultation and a "partnership 
approach" between the Commission, the Member States, and national, regional and local authorities. It 
also promised improved administration, simplified procedures, and better monitoring. The new 
decision-making and consultation procedures created scope for consultation with the community and 
voluntary sector. This was a very important issue in generating another current of opinion in what later 
became the Community Pillar. The Community Workers Co-op was closely involved with urban, rural 
and communities of fate through its wide network of paid or voluntary community workers. The CWC 
developed considerable expertise and ideas in relation to the deployment of structural funds coming 
under various operational programmes. It was here, perhaps, that the seeds of a connection between 
local and national level partnership were planted. The agenda of the CWC was somewhat different 
from that of CORI and the INOU - ultimately seeking to build on the principles of local community 
level participation with aspirations to a radical reshaping of democracy at national level.   
Poverty had become a major focus of attention since the early 1970s, and the situation appeared to 
worsen in the 1980s. In those days the debate was much simpler than it is now. Poverty was deep 
whether conceived in relative or absolute terms. In conditions of relatively sluggish GNP growth from 
1981 up to the late 1980s, mean disposable incomes actually declined in real terms (Layte et al 2000: 
166). In these circumstances, the persistence of relative poverty had none of the ambiguous 
implications it does today. Moreover, that poverty was strongly related to unemployment, which had 
been consistently rising since 1981, pointed to the connections between growth, employment, 
unemployment and income distribution. Finally, the report of the Commission on Social Welfare 
(1986) pointed out that social welfare payments were simply "inadequate" in alleviating poverty, let 
alone in addressing more ambitious redistribution goals. This was a key driver in the emergent CVP. 
The CORI Justice Commission in particular built its intervention in social partnership around the issue 
of income maintenance and tackling poverty, highlighting income inadequacy at every point and 
lobbying for a basic income for all. Interviews with CORI representatives revealed the importance of 
its "analysis" rather than its "representativeness" in defining its role in social partnership.  
Forming the Community Pillar  
The 1980s saw both a mounting crisis of urban and rural development and rising levels of income 
deprivation and social marginalisation affecting all age groups. Sections of civil society responded to 
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 different facets of the crisis - chiefly unemployment (INOU) marginalisation of local communities 
(CWC), and income poverty (CORI). Before long these driving forces would spearhead a push to 
widen social partnership and bring these issues to its centre.  
Opting for the entry tactic? 
There was a lengthy period before a community sector pillar was eventually constituted in social 
partnership. Before the elements of what later became the community pillar were to opt for entry, 
however, they first had to be convinced that it was worth the trouble. They had just developed effective 
voices but would these voices be silenced on participation in the new institutions?  
One apparent fact that attracted their attention was that the new tripartite system (plus farmers) was 
concerned with far more than centralised wage bargaining. It was also having an impact on taxation 
policy and emitting signals to government on social spending and income maintenance levels such as 
how to respond to the 1986 Commission on Social Welfare Report. The shaping of each agreement was 
closely supervised by the Department of the Taoiseach and underpinned by a prior process of 
deliberation at the NESC in which social partners actively participated in wider policy discussions. 
This was a matter that the CORI and INOU were greatly concerned about. 
It was apparent too that these discussions were not simply tokenism. It was the Programme ffor 
Economic and Social Progress (PESP, 1990) that first announced a proposal to instigate local area 
partnership companies, which would require involvement of local community organisations all over the 
state. Yet few of the actors in the national Partnership process had much to say on the subject. 
Prefigured in a NESC report (1990), it appeared to have been put on the agenda by the Taoiseach's 
department in its capacity as go-between with the EU on the matter of how to deploy the largess of the 
Structural funds. This issue was of considerable importance to the CWC. 
Unemployment, while viewed by the social partners and government as a major problem, was not yet 
being directly addressed through social partnership talks by 1990. Independent calls for a national 
forum of state and civil society were mounting and would ultimately yield the National Economic and 
Social Forum. The latter, when it came about, provided a training ground in social partnership for 
representatives of the unemployed, marginalised, poor and other discontented constituencies. 
Moreover, it yielded some innovative policy proposals and provided encouragement that much and 
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 more could be achieved through fuller participation in deliberative institutions such as the NESC and 
Social Partnership - where the "real action" appeared to be. 
A further issue was the widespread resistance to the admission of potentially disruptive and demanding 
"lefty" elements who were very sceptical in any event. Such resistance came not only from within the 
state but also from among existing partners, as is acknowledged by those interviewed on both the CVP 
and statutory side. Even sections of the trade union pillar had resisted the creation of a new pillar - 
perhaps a backhanded acknowledgement of the value of getting a foot in the door! The INOU was 
always convinced that it had a moral right to represent the huge section of the working class that was 
not "at the table" along with their employed brothers and sisters. It was only a matter of time before it 
was persuaded as to its tactical merit.  
It has been noted that there was a crisis of legitimacy in the political elite, and the political situation 
remained fluid in the 1990s. There were clear signs that government coalitions - as became the normal 
pattern from 1989 - were open to influence from the substantial part of the electorate that felt 
economically and socially "disenfranchised" provided they could find a vehicle to channel it. These 
factors would seem to have played some part in persuading the new voices of the socially excluded to 
seek participation and in breaking down the resistance of existing partners.  
Coming together 
The Community Pillar, as constituted in the 1996 talks, comprised 8 bodies, one of which - the 
Community Platform - was an umbrella acting for several further groups (Figure 1). They had very 
varied philosophies and practical agendas, although there was common ground in the context of the 
depth and extent of disadvantage prevalent at the time. While highlighting shared concerns, they 
retained their own distinctive analysis and critique of current policies, and their separate identities, even 
when in social partnership.  
The "Community Pillar" formally came into existence between the drafting of the NESC Strategy of 
autumn 1996 and the negotiations for the Partnership 2000 agreement which ensued from it later that 
year. Government proposed the separate Community Pillar as a mechanism for regulated access to 
social partnership for those associations wishing to be part of the process. An alternative mechanism, 
favoured by the CWC, was that the Community Platform, which they had initiated, would constitute 
the new "social partner" and, as a bottom-up entity, offer more independence at the table. In the event, 
both the Pillar and the Platform operated but the Platform was, as far as the State was concerned, just 
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 another member of the pillar. In the event, the Platform had fifteen member organisations, and 
constituted one of eight associations recognised by Government as making up the Pillar. But some of 
the other seven organisations with independent membership of the Pillar were also members of the 
Platform (Figure 1). In a sense these organisations could show solidarity with the Platform while 
maintaining the right to vote separately in the event of a split over the terms of a Partnership deal or 
policy matter. However, the clumsiness of how the Pillar was constituted also suppressed fissures that 
would later surface. 
Figure 1: Structure of the Community Pillar and Platform in the negotiations for Partnership 
2000 in 1996 
Community Pillar members  Community Platform members 
1. Conference of Religious in Ireland (CORI)* 
2. Irish National Organisation of the 
Unemployed (INOU)*   
3. National Women's Council of Ireland 
(NWCI)* 
4. Society of St Vincent de Paul (SVP)* 
5. Community Platform (a group of 
organisations – see column 2) 
6.  National Youth Council (NYCI) 
7. Irish Congress of Trade Unions Centres for 
the Unemployed (ICTUCU) 
8. Protestant Aid (PA) 
1. Conference of Religious in Ireland 
2. Irish National Organisation of the 
Unemployed  
3. National Women’s Council of Ireland 
4. Society of St Vincent de Paul 
5. Community Action Network,  
6. Community Workers Co-operative  
7. European Anti-Poverty Network [Ireland]  
8. Focus on Children,  
9. Forum of People with Disabilities,  
10. Gay and Lesbian Equality Network,  
11. Irish Commission for Prisoners Overseas,  
12. Irish Rural Link,  
13. Irish Traveller Movement,  
14. One Parent Exchange Network  
15. Pavee Point 
 
* Organisations both in the Platform and recognised in the Pillar in own right 
The main driving forces in the Pillar from the outset were the Irish National Organisation of the 
Unemployed (INOU), the Community Workers' Co-op (CWC), and the Justice Commission of the 
Conference of Religious in Ireland (CORI).  Other organisations became more central after a time, in 
particular the National Women's Council (NWCI) and St Vincent de Paul Society (SVP). As noted 
above, the INOU, CWC and CORI Justice Commission were key elements that emerged in the 1980s 
and later became the engines of the CVP. Each of these organisations was defined by critical responses 
to aspects of the social malaise of the 1980s. However, the particular focus in each case was distinct 
and different. For the CWC, involvement in social partnership at national level grew out of its critical 
focus on the allocation and use of EU Structural Funds through operational programmes promoting 
local development in deprived and marginalised communities. The CWC articulated a distinct view on 
matters of local empowerment through co-operation and participative democracy. This philosophy they 
also aspired to apply in the Pillar and in Social Partnership. For them, the question of how far they 
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 could go with this amid the realpolitik of contending state and market actors was not so sharply posed 
in the early 1990s as would later become.  
The CORI Justice Commission had quite a different set of pre-occupations. The Justice Commission 
was initiated in the early 1980s at a time when many were critical of the Church's obsession with 
private morality and an absence of any economic critique of capitalist morality. Its focus was on 
economic and social justice in several areas, particularly income deprivation. In the immediate term 
CORI sought the have the Commission on Social Welfare (1986) recommendations on minimum levels 
of payment implemented. In the long term, CORI sought to replace the current system of tax and 
welfare with a Basic Income system that was both work neutral and family-formation neutral. The 
persistent focus of the CORI on income mechanisms gave it an enduring basis for a critique of income 
maintenance policy measures and frequent opportunities to intervene in the context of high profile 
events such as the Budget and eventually social partnership talks. When unemployment eventually fell 
in the latter half of the 1990s, CORI was undaunted. Indeed it gained a higher profile in that it could 
focus attention of the widening relative income disparity between large welfare dependent sections of 
the population and the newly prospering sections of those in employment. 
 Matters were otherwise for the third key organisation in the nascent Community Pillar - the INOU, 
which provides the focus discussion below. In some respects, the INOU's story is indicative of the kind 
stories that could be told about the other pillar participants and Pillar as a whole. In other respects it 
records only the particular experience of one component in the Pillar. It is hoped that even on the basis 
of a short account it will be possible to question some generalisations about the Community Pillar, 
either to the effect that it jeopardises democracy or that it simply incorporates the dissent that might 
otherwise be expressed. Empirical examination of these stories may eventually yield a different account 
that complies more with a view of this interface of social actors and the state that has the merit of 
nuance.  
Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed 
The following discussion draws on interviews carried out with several leading INOU figures -past and 
present (sounds vague can you say number of interviews) 
The INOU was founded in 1987 when a number of local groups and some national organisations came 
together to form a national organisation. The founding conference followed an almost unbroken series 
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 of monthly increases in numbers on the live register between January 1981 and December 1986 (from 
86,000 to 245,100). Some time later it appointed Mike Allen - made redundant by a company in 
Galway in 1983 - as its General Secretary. Allen, in his own account, stresses that it was unemployed 
people who established the INOU (Allen 1998: 3/4). Quotations below, however are from several 
interviewees. 
From the outset, the INOU concentrated on mobilising the unemployed: 
"…in the beginning it was about mobilising unemployed people to politically assert their rights and 
demands, so it was about trying to organise strong local groups, gear them up to be campaigning, 
lobbying organisations, a lot of street campaigns, demos, stunts, you know on the ground stuff…" 
Initial hopes for success along this route gave way as protests failed to happen on any significant scale. 
In late 1992, following a major organisational effort, against a background of 300,000 unemployed, 
they could only mobilise 3,000 for a march demanding the right to work. One conclusion drawn was 
that mobilising the unemployed failed because there was no positive element in the unemployed 
identity:  
"I suppose models that we were looking at in terms of mobilising civic society (were) like the black 
movement in the States, the women’s movement, the disability movement. I think what we were learning 
was that unemployed people didn’t necessarily self identify with unemployed movements so we were 
not going to get much further in that kind of mass participation mould of strategy and we had to rethink 
that a bit." 
Without abandoning campaigns and protesting, the INOU increasingly made policy inputs to 
government and, although supported by some trade unions, were critical of the latter for not achieving 
any gains for the unemployed in social partnership. They were probably unique in maintaining the 
policy goal of full employment, not only in comparison with policy-makers and the trade unions at the 
time, but also with other organisations in the community/voluntary sector. They viewed campaigns for 
a basic income as indicative of an "end of work" thesis, which they rejected as a distraction from full 
employment. Here there was a clear difference with the CORI focus. The INOU were critical of the 
1987 Programme for National Recovery (PNR) agreed. They took the view that "the underlying 
assumption in that agreement (was): 'we don’t particularly need to talk about unemployment in any 
Larragy 2006: 13  
 real sense but it will come right as a result of what we are doing here and some sort of undefined 
process'”.  
The next pay deal, the Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) agreed in 1990, also 
posed the issue of participation. But the INOU decided not to seek to participate in talks then either 
although it was debated. As one informant noted: "we weren’t strong enough: if we were there, we 
weren’t sure what we would be pushing for and if we didn’t get it, we didn’t know what we would do… 
you wouldn’t have been strong enough to be in there, in that ring". However, they did engage with the 
trade unions, which promised to articulate the interests of the unemployed and to listen to the INOU in 
the PESP talks.  
Later, when the INOU became participants (in 1996), they observed the limits of the earlier strategy. 
While the trade unions actively engaged in the wage and related negotiations, the INOU negotiator 
noted, "once it moved off wages, there was nobody in government buildings except for (named ICTU 
official) and one or two other people". While this could be seen as "class betrayal", said one 
respondent, the INOU reading was more mundane: "It would be rare that somebody would deliberately 
do you in, but simply by your absence your interest isn’t put forward, and you see that when you are at 
the table yourself " 
Initially the INOU, like other organisations, developed a more active dialogue with certain government 
departments rather than with the formal partnership framework.  
"We had established quite a good working relationship at a policy level with Social Welfare around 
areas where we had common interest, where they were trying to get people back to work, and we were 
saying: 'this won’t work and that will'. Obviously there were areas of conflict where they were trying to 
knock people off the dole. But where there was common ground, we developed quite good 
relationships, at a political level to some extent and, more significantly at senior civil servant level, so 
that their people would talk to us about programmes they were developing" 
The British experience under Thatcher and the threat of US style Workfare coming to Ireland was fresh 
in the minds of the INOU. They saw their role in part as defending against coercive approaches to 
active labour market policies. "(These ideas were) constantly on the agenda from government’s point of 
view and I suppose it is a kind of a negative kind of way of stating the achievements of the INOU. But 
certainly one of the achievements was that there were programmes, I think absolutely definitely, that 
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 would have been introduced into Ireland to no good for the people who had gone through them - if it 
hadn’t been for the presence of the INOU." 
In the event, a few years of capacity building took place before the INOU actively sought to be 
involved at the partnership table. Two key policy developments paved the way. First, the 1992 Joint 
Oireachtas Committee on Unemployment was short lived but, for the first time, invited organisations of 
the unemployed and other related bodies to make presentations as equals, as the INOU saw it, 
alongside the traditional social partners. It was established in response to calls for a forum on 
unemployment from the INOU and others, and was their first real hearing. While the Joint Committee 
folded with the fall of the FF/PD coalition, and had no substantive policy effect, it generated a short 
public debate on controversial and then hot topic of "Workfare". More significant perhaps, from a 
governance perspective, it furthered the campaign for an independent Forum on unemployment, 
possibly emulating the Anglo-Irish Forum of the mid-1980s - an idea that had been mooted much 
earlier but was taken up increasingly by the INOU.  
Second, following the collapse of the FF/PD coalition of 1989-92, the incoming FF/Labour government 
set up the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) in 1993. This was a much more ambitious and 
wider body in which the non-governmental sector rubbed shoulders with elected parliamentarians and 
government officials under an independent chairperson, and at a remove from the Oireachtas. It also 
included representatives from the "traditional social partners". Unlike its predecessor, the NESF has 
survived, through a process of evolution, and become a significant partnership institution, as noted 
above. The initial NESF had two broad strands to address - unemployment and social policy. The 
INOU identified the NESF as the central focus for its activity and made a very full intervention in the 
its first report on the ending of long-term unemployment (NESF 1994).  
The experience of the NESF both strengthened the standing of the INOU and its confidence that it 
could hold its own in the central social partnership arenas. Also, it had utilised the NESF to work out a 
range of policies in dialogue with other policy actors, much of which was now in a published NESF 
report, which it could use as a basis for participation in partnership. It began to seek recognition of its 
status as legitimate representative of the unemployed. The trade unions could not claim to represent 
them adequately because unemployed people were usually not union members. Of course, the INOU 
were not representative of the majority of the unemployed in any formal sense, but they were the only 
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 dedicated organisation of unemployed people and they were very conscious of their accountability to 
the many local activist organisations of unemployed people. They adopted a corporatist view of social 
partnership and justified their place in representational terms on behalf of some 20% of the working 
population who were neither employed nor represented by the trade unions. They saw themselves as 
different - in this sense - from other community and voluntary sector groups that began to seek social 
partnership status around then, and as having a more clear-cut case.  
The pragmatic engagement of the INOU in Ireland resonates to some extent with developments in 
European employment policy, as expressed in the Delors White Paper of 1993, the so-called Essen 
Process from 1994, the provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty Title on employment, and later the 
European Employment Strategy. Ireland was one of the member states more receptive to these 
developments in the mid-1990s, and promoted them under its presidency prior to the Amsterdam 
Treaty. It is probably fair to say that the INOU had a non-trivial influence in shaping the thinking of 
government over that period 
By 1994 a new Rainbow coalition of Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left had replaced the 
FF/Labour coalition. Taoiseach John Bruton had been lately persuaded of the merits of social 
partnership. He did not see a special case for the INOU but was disposed towards having a mechanism 
to include the community and voluntary sector in the process. It is sometimes contended that the CVP 
were admitted to the talks in 1996 without any prior involvement in the preparatory process. This is not 
quite correct. In 1985 a representative from each of the INOU and the National Women's Council were 
appointed as government nominees to the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). The INOU 
utilised this opportunity fully to influence Strategy into the 21st Century (NESC 1996), which formed 
the basis for the partnership talks that autumn. This was important to the INOU: "We had a very fast 
learning curve ourselves in NESC I suppose but it did make us realise very quickly how important 
NESC was and how that Strategic document was the negotiations to some degree not just the 
framework for it… I think we copped that fairly early on and we realised: sure this is where the action 
is, it was more strategically important than we thought it had been to be on NESC" 
The INOU pathway into Social Partnership was, of course a means to more concrete ends, and being a 
social partner was not an objective in its own right. It was always seen as a double-edged sword. 
Indeed, the INOU almost left social partnership at the first hurdle when a Partnership 2000 proposal to 
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 implement the recommended minimum social welfare rates of the 1986 Commission on Social Welfare 
was pulled at the final stage of negotiations. This was a critical test because one of the justifications for 
the INOU being in the talks was precisely the failure of the unions to deliver this demand in the 
previous deals and was pursued not only in the Partnership talks but also at the preliminary stage of 
NESC deliberations. If the INOU now failed to deliver that, participation in Social Partnership was 
effectively discredited. So close to the wire did this issue go that Secretary General Allen was literally 
walking in the doors of the national TV station to broadcast the INOU's rejection of the package when 
he got word from government conceding the demand. This was a landmark in the INOU's own terms, 
although strictly speaking the deal would have gone ahead even if the INOU rejected it. It is not clear 
exactly what other pillar components would have done - they might have stayed in. 
It is not precisely clear what prompted the last minute concession but it is more than possible that a 
good deal of tick-tack went on between the Department of the Taoiseach, Finance and Social Welfare - 
the key ministries after the INOU position was known. Moreover, Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic-
Left, respectively, headed up these departments, which probably helped. It is possible that the state of 
public finances was beginning to look better than was let out in the talks. A consensus may have 
emerged that there was more to be gained on the political front by conceding the point and taking credit 
for what would probably be affordable in any event. This, rather than the notion of a strong bargaining 
hand on the part of the INOU, seems likelier. Nevertheless, without the INOU to beat a loud drum 
about it, the concession might not have been made. In the short term at least, the entry tactic worked. 
This episode should not overshadow the range of other matters that the INOU had pursued actively in 
the NESF, the NESC, and the Partnership talks, which were subsequently tied into the Partnership 
2000. These included moderating the policy approach through active labour market policies that were 
supportive and not punitive. They won commitments on the development of a local employment 
service, expanding Community Employment and the continuation of the relatively generous Back to 
Work Allowance schemes. It was on these more technical fronts that the INOU brought a consistent 
influence to bear. This gave social partnership a moderating influence on policies that government were 
developing to move more people from welfare to work. The INOU can with justification claim that 
they persuaded civil servants of the merits of a more supportive active labour market regime. This 
cannot be discounted: in the middle of 1996 investigative research was carried out by the CSO on live 
register claimants under cover of the Labour Force Survey and had been widely publicised in the media 
Larragy 2006: 17  
 as proof that many on the dole were making fraudulent claims. While there were many voices calling 
for a hard line, this issue was handled in an even-handed way in Partnership 2000.  
This outline does not deal with subsequent developments. But obviously, when unemployment began 
to decline rapidly in from 1996, the context for the INOU changed too.  In time, its impact would 
lessen as a result of this. It has developed a more extensive service role, while continuing to address a 
range of issues in relation to income maintenance, active labour market policies, the treatment of the 
unemployed at social welfare offices etc. But in the pre 1997 phase, the INOU representatives of the 
unemployed made sustained interventions over the best part of a decade, they developed considerable 
expertise, and a presence on-the-ground. They were active in developing a European network of similar 
organisations and learned about policy alternatives to what was happening across the water. They had a 
very articulate leadership that repudiated the culture of blame that neo-liberals attach to the 
unemployed. They went into social partnership because that was where the action was at the time, and 
because other methods yielded little success.  
Conclusions 
Some commentaries – mostly by economists – on social partnership have focused on the question of 
whether it had any impact on phenomenal growth rates achieved in the 1990s (Baccaro and Simoni 
2004) and most of them have concluded that it has not. This paper is less concerned with this type of 
economistic question than with identifying some of the effects of participation by the CVP. For 
instance, Irish society, despite the increase in total and average income and the ending of large-scale 
unemployment, and the effective achievement of full employment, is clearly at least as unequal today 
in terms of relative income as it was in the early 1990s. Are these outcomes that the INOU and other 
organisations involved in the community pillar process could have done something more to avoid had 
they, for instance, adopted a different strategy?  It would be tempting to say they were incorporated 
into a neo-liberal project but we do have to be wary of easy generalisations, and of anachronistic 
statements about missing the mark on the equality agenda. Moreover, the impact of the INOU, and the 
CVP as a whole needs to be seen in conjunction with that of the trade unions in social partnership. A 
neo-liberal policy would involve labour market de-regulation, the subordination of organised labour, 
depression of wages and possibly a “shaking out” of manufacturing and related areas of employment 
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 where unions were strong and productivity lagging. But one does not need to be an apologist of social 
partnership to notice that that path was not pursued as the foundation of the boom years of the 1990s. 
Others have asked whether social partnership and the CVP, in particular, compromised representative 
democracy by placing influence in a few hands without clear lines of accountability (O’Cinneide 
1998). In examining the record of the INOU in retrospect, it is difficult to see how it might have 
harmed representative democracy. It would be hard to justify a conclusion that the CVP participation in 
social partnership was any threat to representative democracy on the basis of the evidence of the INOU. 
On the other hand it would be unfair to imply that the CVP was simply incorporated by the state, 
particularly in the context of the very difficult issues and decisions it took, and the tactical successes it 
had. A fairer characterisation, is seems, is that the CVP had a legitimate role in the context of social 
partnership. On a range of issues affecting the unemployed and welfare-dependent population the CVP 
took up a challenge in a way that was permissible and even laudable in a democracy and helped offset 
the imbalance of power that otherwise would exist in the institutions that were set up. They contributed 
to more moderate policy outcomes than might have emerged without the institutions of social 
partnership, and without their participation in these institutions. Irish unemployment policies of the 
1990s were influenced by these developments and the CVP can take credit for moderating the policies 
adopted by Irish governments in the 1990s on unemployment and for defending the position of 
unemployed people on social welfare. It cannot be credited with the achievement of full employment - 
though that was eventually more or less achieved - but it can be credited for believing it was possible 
when nobody else did, and for adopting the role of protecting the interests of unemployed people in the 
context or achieving it  
The moderating influence exercised by the CVP should not be viewed in isolation. It needs to be 
emphasised that its influence operated within the institutional context of social partnership which, in 
turn, was resorted to by government in order to address a serious fiscal crisis and crisis of legitimacy 
among the political elite that flared up over a definite period. The CVP influence has lessened in recent 
years and it may not easily regain the degree of influence that it had while unemployment and fiscal 
crisis were major issues, and it has had to adjust to a less prominent role. Indeed, in many respects the 
problem of legitimacy, which faced the political elite, has passed into history, while the community 
pillar now face a dilemma as they are no longer able to confer legitimacy to the extent that they once 
were, and may risk redundancy.  
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 The prospects for the community pillar's significance are not yet clear. There have been significant 
departures from it and new entrants to it. Moreover, much depends on the thinking of government, as it 
is no longer as constrained to liaise with the CVP as it was. From this direction, claims have been made 
for the significance of the pillar in a "problem-solving" model of social partnership, the implication 
being that it will be business as usual. This view may minimise the actual significance of the Pillar in 
the past in conferring legitimacy at a time when the political elite badly needed it. At a moment when 
unemployment was a hot political issue and governments were depending on garnering marginal 
voters, it paid to listen to the organisations representing the unemployed and community sector 
associations. On the other hand, it is seems obvious that there is a hierarchy of social partners in the 
Irish model and the CVP is somewhat subordinate in bargaining power terms in a model that might be 
characterised as "competitive corporatism" (Roche and Cradden 2003: 86).  
To say that the community pillar lacks strategic bargaining power is not to deny any influence to it but 
to acknowledge that such influence has waxed and waned. And the Pillar's possibilities for achieving 
visible effects may depend on the political significance of bringing the standpoint of voiceless and 
vulnerable sections of society into the frame. The main bargaining chip the CVP has in social 
partnership it is whether it rejects or signs off on a deal. But just how far they could "play it" depends 
on the political context - or what such a rejection might cost a government in popularity. That chip had 
an impact in the context of negotiating Partnership 2000, when the threat to reject the pact resulted in a 
last minute concession by Government. But the threatened rejection of Sustaining Progress in 2002 by 
a section of the Pillar resulted only in that section's expulsion from the partnership process. Times have 
evidently changed!  
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